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Article 9

Solicitation on Postal Premises:
United States v. Kokinda
I.

INTRODUCTION

Whether one considers United States Postal premises a
public forum or not, solicitating contributions on a postal sidewalk will simply not be allowed. Postal regulations prohibit
solicitation on postal premises. 1 In United States v. Kokinda, 2
a plurality of the United States Supreme Court held that section 232.1(h)(l) did not violate the first amendment's protection
of free speech.a The Court found that a sidewalk situated entirely on postal premises was a non-public forum and that a
regulation barring solicitation on such a sidewalk was reasonable under the circumstances.
Part II of this note reviews the background, facts, and
Supreme Court's rationale of Kokinda. Part III then discusses
specific concerns relating to the public/non-public forum analysis used by the Court and suggests how the Court might have
avoided this form of analysis. Finally, this note concludes that
the Court should abandon the public/non-public forum analysis
and instead apply the traditional time, place, and manner standard to content-neutral restrictions of protected speech.
II.

A.

THE

Kokinda

CASE

Background

The government's reasons for abridging one's freedom of
speech4 can be placed into two broad categories. The first cate-

1.
:39 C.F.R. § 2:32.1(a)-(q) (1990). Section 2:32.1(h)(1) provides, in pertinent
part: "Soliciting alms and contributions, campaigning for election to any public
office, collecting private debts, commercial soliciting and vending, and displaying or
distributing commercial advertising on postal premises are prohibited."
2.
110 S. Ct. :H15 (1990).
::1. In Kokinda, Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court in which
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia joined. Justice Kennedy
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting
opinion in which Justices Marshall and Stevens joined and in which Justice
Blackmun joined as to Part I. ld. at 3117.
4.
U.S. CoNST. amend. I provides, in pertinent part: "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . . "
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gory is the government's restriction on speech because of its
content, which Professor Lawrence Tribe describes as government action "aimed at communicative impact."5 Professor
Tribe considers this type of regulation under a theory he labels
"track one" analysis. 6 Governmental action under "track one"
analysis takes on a number of different forms. 7 "Track one"
analysis is typically very rigid. An important general rule
under track one" is "[w]henever the harm feared could be averted by a further exchange of ideas, governmental suppression is
conclusively deemed unnecessary."8 When content-based regulations do not fall within one of the traditional "unprotected
categories,"9 they are subject to strict scrutiny, requiring the
government to "show that its regulation is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end." 10
The second category of reasons for abridging one's freedom
of speech involves government restrictions "aimed at noncommunicative impact but nonetheless having adverse effects on
communicative opportunity." 11 Professor Tribe refers to such
content-neutral regulations as "track two" analysis. 12 Examples of content-neutral regulations include prohibiting the use

Fi.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 790 (2d ed. 1988).
6.
!d. at 791.
7.
See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530
(1980) (statute barring the inclusion of inserts that discussed political matters in
monthly utility bills struck down on the ground that the government may not
choose which subjects are appropriate for speech); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (prohibition of
information about the price of over-the-counter drugs invalidated); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (conviction of an individual for disturbing the peace due to
the content of a message on the person's jacket reversed); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (ban on the teaching of foreign languages invalid); Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (conviction of an individual who violated a statute
forbidding one from obstructing the draft or causing military insubordination
upheld).
TRIBE, supra note 5, at 833-34.
8.
9.
See generally Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990)
(certain statements of opinion get no special first amendment protection); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) ("obscenity is not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech or press"); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. Fi68 (1942) ("fighting words" are among the classes of unprotected speech);
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (incitement of illegal acts constitutes
an unprotected category).
10.
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981) (citing Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455, 461, 464-65 (1980)).
TRIBE, supra note 5, at 790.
11.
!d. at 792.
12.
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of sound trucks which emit "loud and raucous noises" while
operating on the streets, 13 forbidding leaflet distribution to
prevent littering, 14 and disallowing doorbell ringing when distributing literature is necessary to protect re~idents from annoyance and crime. 15 This note discusses only the second
category-content-neutral regulation.
When confronting a governmental action which abridges
one's freedom of speech, the Court must first determine the
level of judicial scrutiny to apply to the protected speech regulation.16 Previously, the Court adopted a forum analysis to
determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply. 17 If the
regulation is content-neutral (track two) and the speech occurs
in a public forum (e.g., public parks, streets, or other property
expressly or by tradition dedicated to speech activity), then
strict scrutiny applies. 18 Strict scrutiny requires the regulation to "be finely tailored to serve substantial state interests,
and the justifications offered for any distinctions it draws must
be carefully scrutinized." 19 Furthermore, under strict scrutiny,
the regulation must not close "adequate alternative channels
for communication."20 If the speech activity occurs in a nonpublic forum, however, the regulation is subject only to rational
basis scrutiny. 21
Not all government-owned property is considered a public
forum. Some government-owned facilities, although public, are
used for purposes not particularly linked to expression and are
thus considered non-public fora. 22 Previous to the Court's deci-

13.
E.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (five-to-four decision upholding
ban).
14.
E.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (striking the ban).
lfi.
E.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (plurality opinion,
four-to-four decision, striking the ordinance because a less restrictive means was
available).
16.
United States v. Kokinda, l:i.O S. Ct. 3115, :3118 (1990).
17.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800
(1985) (four-to-three decision with two taking no part in the decision).
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
18.
(five-to-four decision).
19.
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980).
20.
TRIBE, supra note 5, at 992.
21.
Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (the regulation must be "reasonable and not an effort
to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view").
22.
See, e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (a courthouse and its
grounds have not been traditionally open for expressive activities and are therefore
not a public forum); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981) (recognizing that the "First Amendment does not
guarantee access tu property simply because it is owned or controlled by the
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sion in Kokinda, a conflict existed among the various United
States Courts of Appeals concerning the status of sidewalks on
Postal Service property.:! 3
B.

Facts of Kokinda

Volunteers for the National Democratic Policy Committee
set up a table on a post office sidewalk "to solicit contributions,
sell books and subscriptions to the organization's newspaper,
and distribute literature addressing a variety of political issues.":!4 The sidewalk is the only path to the front doors of the
post office from the parking lot and lies entirely on Postal Service property. 25 After receiving between forty and fifty complaints, the postmaster asked the volunteers to leave. 26 They
refused and were arrested. 27
Respondents were convicted of violating 39 C.F.R. §
232.1(h)(l) by a United States Magistrate in the District of
Maryland and received modest fines and imprisonment. 28
Respondents appealed to the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland, which affirmed their convictions. 29
Their convictions, however, were reversed by a divided panel of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 30
The Fourth Circuit held that the postal sidewalk was a public
forum and that no significant governmental interest was served
by banning solicitation.:n Because of conflicting decisions
among the federal courts of appeals, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. 32

government"); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (sidewalks and streets on a
military base may he placed off limits to political speakers since the purpose of a
military base is to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum).
2.3.
United States v. Belsky, 799 F.2d 148.5 (11th Cir. 1986) (non-public); United
States v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 64.3 (.3d Cir. 1986) (non-public). But see United States v.
Kokinda, 866 F.2d 699 (4th Cir. 1989) (public), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. :3115 (1990).
24.
United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 8115, 8117-18 (1990).
ld. at :3118.
25.
26.
Id.
27.
ld.
2H.
Kokinda received a $50 fine and 10 days in prison. Pearl received a $100
fine and 80 days imprisonment. United States v. Kokinda, 866 F.2d 699, 700 (4th
Cir. 1989), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 8115 (1990).
29.
ld. at 701.
::10.
ld. at 700.
:n.
United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. ::1115, :H18 (1990).
:j2,
ld.
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The Plurality's Reasoning

The Court first determined whether the postal sidewalk
was a public or non-public forum. Finding it to be a non-public
forum, 33 the plurality applied a minimum scrutiny (reasonableness) analysis and found the regulation to pass constitutional muster. 34

1.

Postal premises as a non-public forum

The Court rejected the argument that despite being on
postal premises, the sidewalk is indistinguishable from the
municipal sidewalk on the opposite side of the parking lot. 35
The mere fact that the property in question was a sidewalk
does not dictate forum analysis. 36 A municipal sidewalk running parallel to a road is a public passageway and therefore a
traditional public forum sidewalk. 37 The Postal Service sidewalk merely gave persons engaged in postal business access to
the post office building. 38
Continuing its analysis, the Court found that the postal
sidewalk had not been dedicated to any "expressive activity."39
The Court pointed out that postal premises are only dedicated
to "the posting of public notices on designated bulletin
boards."40 However, the Court recognized that other first
amendment activities had been permitted on postal property.41 Nevertheless, the Court stated that the existence of a
regulation prohibiting disruption42 and the allowance of some

:n

!d. at :3121.
34.
Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, fimnd that it was unnecessary to
determine whether the sidewalk was a public or non-public forum, since the postal
regulation at issue met the traditional standards applied to time, place, and
manner restrictions. !d. at 3125; see also infra part III.B.
as. !d. at :n2o.
36.
!d.
37.
!d.
3R.
!d.
39.
!d. at 3121.
40.
!d. (citing 39 C.F.R. § 232.1(o) (1990).
41.
!d. ("To be sure, individuals or groups have been permitted to leaflet,
speak, and picket on postal premises . . . .").
42.
39 C.F.R. § 232.1(e) (1990) provides, in pertinent part: "Disorderly conduct,
or conduct which creates loud and unusual noise, or which obstructs the usual use
uf entrances . . . , stairways, and parking lots, or which otherwise . . . impedes
or disturbs the general public in transacting business or obtaining the services
provided on property, is prohibited."
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speech activities did "not add up to the dedication of postal
property to speech activities."43 Thus, even though the forum
in Kokinda was not a purely non-public forum because it had
been dedicated to some expressive activity, the Court held that
"regulation of the reserved non-public uses would still require
application of the reasonableness test."44

2. Reasonableness of the postal regulation
Having determined that the postal sidewalk in question
was a non-public forum, the Court then applied the minimum
scrutiny standard. Under this standard, the regulation not only
must be reasonable 45 but also must not be "an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker's view."46
The Postal Service has regulated solicitation for yearsY
An important reason for finding the regulation at issue to be
reasonable 48 was that "[t]he purpose of the forum in this case
[wa]s to accomplish the most efficient and effective postal delivery system"49 possible. The Court reasoned that the disruption
and delay caused by solicitation was a significant enough interference with "Congress' mandate to ensure the most effective
and efficient distribution of the mails" to enable the Postal
Service to regulate such solicitation. 50

43.
Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121; see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983) ("selective access does not transform
government property into a public forum").
Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3121.
44.
45.
"The Government's decision to restrict access to a non-public forum need
only be reasonable; it need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation." Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 808
(1985) (emphasis in original).
46.
!d. at 800 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 46).
47.
The Court recites a history of postal regulation of solicitation since 1958,
when "internal guidelines 'strictly prohibited' the '[s]oliciting (of] subscriptions,
canvassing for the sale of any article, or making collections . . . in buildings
operated by the Post Office Department, or on the grounds or sidewalks within the
lot lines' of postal premises." Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3122 (quoting Postal Service
Manual, Facilities Transmittal Letter 8, Buildings Operation: Buildings Operated by
the Post Office Department § 622.8 (1958)). The Postal Service gradually created
various exceptions to its ban on solicitation until it became unmanageable. The
Postal Service decided that a categorical ban on solicitation was again necessary.
"Finally, in 1978, the [Postal) Service promulgated the regulation at issue here."
Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3122.
48.
!d. at 3125.
49.
!d. at 3122.
50.
!d. at 3124.
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3. The regulation found to be content-neutral
The Court held the regulation to be a categorical ban on
solicitation and thus content-neutral. 51 The Court recognized
that "[n]othing suggests the Postal Service intended to discourage one viewpoint and advance another . . . . By excluding
all . . . groups from engaging in [solicitation] . . . the Postal
Service is not granting 'one side of a debatable public question . . . a monopoly in expressing its views."'52

III.

ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court's use of public/non-public forum analysis may not have been necessary to validate the postal regulation at issue. The Court could have achieved a similar result by
applying the traditional standards of time, place, and manner
restrictions. 53 By applying these restrictions, the Court could
have avoided the forum labeling that has and will probably
continue to be the source of much controversy. 54

A. Non-public Forum Analysis
1. Development of public I non-public forum doctrine
The public forum doctrine found its genesis in a line of
cases decided during the 1930s and 1940s.55 During the 1930s,
streets, sidewalks, and parks were recognized as the clearest
examples of a completely public forum. 56
During the mid-1960s, university students were convicted
of trespassing for having engaged in a demonstration on jailhouse grounds to protest the arrest of fellow students who had

ld. at 3124-25.
ld. (quoting Monterey County Democratic Cent. Comm. v. United States
Serv., 812 F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted)).
16A AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 517 (1979).
See Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public
Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L.
REV. 1219 (1984); Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The
History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987); Geoffrey
R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987).
55.
TRIBE, supra note 5, at 986 n.2.
56.
See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) ("use of
the streets and public places [for assembly and debate of public questions] has,
from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties
of citizens").
51.
52.
Postal
53.
54.

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

206

[Volume 6

sought to desegregate public theaters. 57 In Adderley v. Florida, the Supreme Court upheld the trespass ·convictions. 58 In
doing so, the Court returned to pre-Hague v. Committee for
Industrial Organization 59 emphasis on the government as a
private property owner with the "power to preserve the
property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully
dedicated."60 Adderley laid the foundation for the non-public
forum doctrine.
The doctrine "emerged as a fully viable creation as a group
of decisions in the 1970s."61 In Perry Education Association v.
Perry Local Educators' Association, 62 the Supreme Court set
out three types of forums. The first type is the "quintessential
public forum, [such as] streets and parks [that] by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and
debate .... "63 The second type is the semi-public forum, "consist[ing] of public property which the State has opened for use
by the public as a place for expressive activity."64 Examples of
the second type include libraries, 65 schools, 66 and fairgrounds.67 The third type is "[p]ublic property which is not by
tradition or designation a forum for public communication .... "68 To determine the appropriate level of judicial
scrutiny, the courts must first categorize the property in question.

57.
58.
59.

Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).

ld. at 48.
Hague, 307 U.S. 496 (recognizing a right of minimum access to a public
forum for speech purposes). Prior to Hague, the Court did not recognize a right of
access to public places for free speech purposes since it viewed the government as
a private property owner with the right to exercise domain over its property.
60.
Adderley, 385 U.S. at 47.
61.
TRIBE, supra note 5, at 986.
62.
63.
64.
65.

460

u.s.

37 (1983).

ld. at 45.
ld.
See, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (Fortas, J., plurality)

(reversing a conviction of black civil rights demonstrators who protested segregated
library conditions by quietly sitting-in at the library).
66.
See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding an
anti-noise ordinance prohibiting noise or interference while classes were in session
so that the basic educational function of the school was not disturbed).
67.
See, e.g., Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640 (1981) (holding that the Minnesota State Fair is a limited public forum
and distinguishing it from traditional public forums like streets and parks).
68.
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. :37, 46 (1983).
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2. Appropriateness of the non-public forum doctrine
As previously mentioned, the standard used to examine
non-public forum restrictions on protected speech is that of
minimum scrutiny. In addition, the regulation in question may
not "suppress expression merely because public officials oppose
the speaker's view."69 Applying this standard, the Court has
upheld restrictions on access to military bases, 70 restrictions
refusing to allow political candidates to advertise on city buses,71 restrictions banning the placement of unstamped mail in
home mailboxes, 7'1. restrictions denying access to a school's internal mail system, 73 and restrictions excluding political advocacy groups from participating in a federal employee charity
fund drive. 74 In fact, no one has successfully challenged government regulation of a non-public forum. This is most likely
because the reasonableness standard is an extremely low standard to satisfy. In contrast, strict scrutiny provides a standard
"'strict' in theory, but usually 'fatal' in fact." 75
Given a lower level of scrutiny for non-public fora,
categorizing the property becomes extremely important. The
Court has increasingly emphasized governmental intent. 76 Unless the public property falls into a traditional public forum, 77
it may become a public forum only by governmental designation as a suitable place for general or limited expression. 78
69.
!d. (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns,
4ii:i U.S. 114, 131 n.7 (1981)).
70.
United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985); Greer v. Spack, 424 U.S.
828 (1976).
71.
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
72.
United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S.
114 (1981).
n. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. :37 (1983).
74.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
75.
Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 n.6 (1984) (quoting Gerald Gunther,
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAHV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972)).
76.
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) ("streets, sidewalks, and
77.
parks, are considered, without more, to be 'public forums'").
78.
In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc., Justice
Blackmun, in a dissenting opinion, argues that the Court effectively reduced the
three categories of general public forum, limited public forum, and non-public
forum into two categories. He stated:
The Court makes it virtually impossible to prove that a forum restricted
to a particular class of speakers is a limited public forum. If the Govern-
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This would be true even where public access would not be incompatible with the primary function of the place. Arguably,
the solicitation of funds outside the post office building,
whether on the street, sidewalk, or the sidewalk leading to the
building, would not be incompatible with or interfere with the
functioning of the post office itself. The public forum doctrine
has perhaps been formulated and reformulated to the point of
becoming manipulative and problematic.
a. Manipulation of the definition of 'public forum." The
Court appears from time to time to ''have circumscribed the
category of 'traditional' public forums by focusing on appearance rather than function-on whether the place looks like a
forum for expressive activity rather than on whether it does in
fact serve as a significant medium of communication."79 In
United States v. Grace,S0 the Court struck down a prohibition
of expressive activity on sidewalks, relying "more on imagery
than on the functional importance" of the sidewalks around the
Supreme Court building and grounds. 81 The Court pointed out
that "[t]here is no separation, no fence, and no indication whatever to persons stepping from the street to the curb and sidewalks that serve as the perimeter of the Court grounds that
they have entered some special type of enclave."82
Similarly, as Justice Brennan argues in his dissent, the
sidewalk at issue in Kokinda could also be regarded as a public
forum rather than a non-public forum. "[S]treets, sidewalks,
and parks, are considered, without more, to be 'public
forums."' 83 The sidewalk at issue, like other sidewalks, acts as
a public thoroughfare and
[f)or the most part, on streets and sidewalks, including the

473
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

ment does not create a limited public forum unless it intends to provide
an "open forum" for expressive activity, and if the exclusion of some
speakers is evidence that the Government did not intend to create such a
forum . . . no speaker challenging denial of access will ever be able to
prove that the forum is a limited public forum. The very fact that the
Government denied access to the speaker indicates that the Government
did not intend to provide an open forum for expressive activity, and un·
der the Court's analysis that fact alone would demonstrate that the forum
is not a limited public forum.
U.S. at 825 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
TRIBE, supra note 5, at 994 (emphasis in original).
461 U.S. 171 (1983).
TRIBE, supra note 5, at 995.
Grace, 461 U.S. at 180.
ld. at 177.
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single-purpose sidewalk at issue here, communication between citizens can be permitted according to the principle
that "one who is rightfully on a street which the state has left
open to the public carries with him as elsewhere the constitutional right to express his views in an orderly fashion." 84

Accordingly, Justice Brennan would have held the postal sidewalk to be a public forum. 85 In addition, strict scrutiny would
have been applied, which would have meant the end of the
postal regulation at issue.
b. Labeling and first amendment values. Akin to the
manipulation problem, 86 another potential danger of
public/non-public forum analysis applied by the Court in this
case is the disposition of free speech cases through labeling. By
invoking the non-public forum label, the Court is able to hide
its first amendment value choices that led to either granting,
denying, or limiting access to public property. A case-by-case
interest balancing approach may be more desirable than the
public/non-public forum analysis. In Kokinda, a balancing approach may not have produced a different result, but it would
have allowed a more candid evaluation of the competing values.
The "public forum" language seems to be used at times by the
Court to "signal conclusions it has reached on other
grounds ...."87 Instead, it may have been
more helpful if the Court were to focus more directly and
explicitly on the degree to which the regulation at issue impinges on the first amendment interest in the free flow of
information; [whereas] translating this inquiry into public
forum language may simply "confuse[] the development of
first amendment principles."88

B.

Traditional Time, Place, and Manner Standard

Public forum analysis is not necessary to find the postal
regulation constitutional. As Justice Kennedy stated in his

84.
United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3128 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943)).
Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3129.
85.
86.
See supra text accompanying notes 79-85.
87.
TRIBE, supra note 5, at 993.
!d. (quoting Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of
88.
Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70
VA. L. REV. 1219, 1223 (1984)).
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concurrence:
It is not necessary, however, to make a precise determination whether this sidewalk and others like it are public or
non-public forums; in my view, the postal regulation at issue
meets the traditional standards we have applied to time,
place, and manner restrictions of protected expression.
"[E]ven in a public forum the government may impose
reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions 'are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest,
and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information."'89

1. Justified without reference to the content of the speech
The plurality stated that "[c]learly the regulation does not
discriminate on the basis of content or viewpoint."90 This is
true because the categorical ban is on all solicitation and does
not pick and choose among speakers. 91 Since the regulation
does not refer to the content of the regulated speech, reasonable restrictions on time, place, and manner may be imposed.92

2. Narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest
The regulation at issue in this case only prohibits "personal solicitations on postal property for the immediate payment of
money."93 Anyone is allowed to participate in other forms of
expressive activity such as political discussions or distributing
literature which solicits support and/or contributions, "provided
there is no in-person solicitation for payments on the
premises."94

89.
United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 8115, 8125-26 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) (citations
omitted).
Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 8124.
90.
Justice Brennan contends that the regulation is not content-neutral since it
91.
is directly tied to what is said. "If a person on postal premises says to members of
the public, 'Please support my political advocacy group,' he cannot be punished. If
he says, 'Please contribute $10,' he is subject to criminal prosecution. His punishment depends entirely on what he says." ld. at 8184 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92.
See supra text accompanying notes 4-10.
Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at :3126 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
98.
94.
ld.
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The government has a significant "interest in reducing
congestion and maintaining the flow of traffic on access walkways leading to its facilities and in protecting postal patrons
from unnecessary distractions or impediments to the conduct of
their business.'>9 5 Also, Congress has mandated for the Postal
Service the goal of being financially self-sufficient. 96 In order
to accomplish this goal, it is important for the Postal Service to
effectively compete with private-sector businesses providing
similar services. Therefore, the Postal Service should be able to
prevent interference and annoyance of its customers, as well as
provide a quiet, businesslike setting where patrons may obtain
the services they are seeking. 97 Solicitation is different from
other forms of conduct in that it is inherently more aggressive,
more intrusive, and more likely to provoke negative
reactions. 98 It thus appears that the regulation is drawn sufficiently narrow to serve an important governmental interest.

3. Ample alternative channels to communicate the information
Sufficient alternatives existed for respondents to communicate the information they sought to convey. The regulation does
not prohibit the distribution of literature soliciting contributions or membership subscriptions. 99 Such literature may be
read later by the postal customer away from the pressure of a
face-to-face encounter with the solicitor. Nor does it prevent
such person from moving to the sidewalk adjacent to the street

95.
Brief for the United States at 14, United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct.
3115 (1990) (No. 88-2031).
Postal Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 91-375, 84 Stat. 719 (codified as
96.
amended at 39 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)).
Brief for the United States at 14-15, United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct.
97.
3115 (1990) (No. 88-20~H).
98.
In Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640 (19R1), Justice Blackmun noted the following distinction about solicitation:
The distribution of literature does not require that the recipient stop in
order to receive the message the speaker wishes to convey; instead, the
recipient is free to read the message at a later time . . . . [S]ales and
the collection of solicited funds not only require the fairgoer to stop, but
also "engender additional confusion . . . because they involve acts of
exchanging articles for money, fumbling for and dropping money, making
change, etc."
ld. at 665 (Biackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Heffron, 299 N.W.2d 79, 87 (Todd,
J., dissenting in part)).
United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3126 (1990).
99.
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to engage in the personal solicitation of immediate contributions.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court held that section 232.l(h)(l) of the
United States postal regulations, 100 prohibiting soliciting,
electioneering, collecting debts, vending, and advertising, did
not violate the first amendment's protection of free speech. In
doing so, the Court used the public/non-public forum analysis
and found the postal sidewalk to be a non-public forum. The
Court accordingly applied the minimum scrutiny standard and
found the regulation to be reasonable under the rational basis
test. The use of the public forum analysis, however, is somewhat troubling. As applied, the Court may either manipulate
the definition of public forum or simply label government property as a non-public forum and thereby not only examine the
regulation in question under the lowest level of scrutiny but
also effectively hide its first amendment value choices. While
possibly true that many areas of law require manipulation and
labeling to reach "fair" results, such devices may also be used
in cases which reach seemingly "unfair" results. The continued
use of the public/non-public forum analysis on areas of first
amendment protection has and will provoke considerable critical commentary. Such critical thought and commentary is important to our legal system in promoting change. Perhaps the
time has come for the Court to not be so concerned with
whether a forum is public or non-public in content-neutral
cases but to simply apply the traditional time, place, and manner standard to content-neutral restrictions of protected speech.

Jay R. Larsen

100.

89 C.F.R. §§ 2:32.1(a)-(q) (1990).

